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SEPARATING PREEMPTION FROM THE SUBJECT
MATTER ANALYSIS OF 35 U.S.C. § 101
Rodney Swartz*
With what seems to be a fluke of history, the Supreme Court has
developed a subject matter analysis framework embodied in 35 U.S.C. §
101 that relies on the preemption doctrine to justify invalidation. This
Article establishes that preemption has a distinct objective that is more
closely aligned with the written description framework of § 112 than with
the subject matter eligibility framework of § 101. As a result of relying
on preemption, the Court has created an arbitrary and difficult to apply
test, resulting in a chasm between the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) and courts that is reminiscent of the
difficulties in the patent system that lead up to the Patent Act of 1952.
In response, this Article proposes a new framework that separates
the preemption analysis from the subject matter eligibility analysis.
Under this new framework, subject matter eligibility would revert to its
pre-Benson approach, where judicial exceptions only cover natural
phenomena, natural laws, and abstract ideas but not their equivalents.
Further, this new framework is based on an objective standard where a
claim is determined to be overly broad if it covers more than what the
inventor has established they invented or modifications that are obvious
to a person having ordinary skill in the art. After developing the new
framework, this Article applies the approach to Parker v. Flook,
Diamond v. Diehr, and Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative
Services, LLC. This analysis demonstrates the new framework, provides
a reasonable explanation for why the field limitation in Flook is not
sufficient for satisfying claim breadth, which was unclear in the Court’s
decision, and addresses the issues around the perceived per se law
against medical devices.
* Senior Articles Editor, SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW, Volume 61. B.S., Chemistry,
Purdue University, 2004; Ph.D., Chemistry, University of Washington, 2010; J.D., Santa
Clara University School of Law, 2022. I would like to thank my friends and colleagues of the
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW, Volume 61 for their thoughtful feedback and encouragement. I
am also forever indebted to Professor Colleen Chien for her mentorship and support during
my time at Santa Clara Law School.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Society benefits through the liberal reward of inventiveness1 so
long as the reward is for novel2 and non-obvious3 creations known to the
inventor.4 This statement reflects the idea that patents promote the
progress of science by granting a time-limited exclusive right to the

1. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 8 (1966).
2. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
3. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2011).
4. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 113 (1853) (“For aught that we now know some future
inventor, in the onward march of science, may discover a mode of writing or printing at a
distance by means of the electric or galvanic current, without using any part of the process or
combination set forth in the plaintiff’s specification. His invention may be less complicated—
less liable to get out of order—less expensive in construction, and in its operation. But yet if
it is covered by this patent the inventor could not use it, nor the public have the benefit of it
without the permission of this patentee.”).
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invention,5 but that progress may be stalled if patents are rewarded for
known innovations, trivial improvements,6 or are so broad as to cover
future innovations.7 While this statement may seem self-evident, it is
not a reflection of where the patent system and its case law have been or
where it currently stands.
For example, before the Patent Act of 1952 (“1952 Act”), the courts
struggled to articulate a reasonable test for inventiveness (what is now
known as non-obviousness), creating at times confusing and difficult to
apply laws.8 In probably the best-known case on the subject, Cuno
Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp.,9 the Supreme Court
articulated a test that required a “flash of creative genius” to satisfy
inventiveness and, further, that the genius must be apparent from the
invention.10 This test was perceived by many to be confusing and
difficult to apply, and it took an act of Congress in the 1952 Act before
predictability was restored to the patent system.11 In the 1952 Act,
Congress replaced the subjective “flash of genius” test articulated by the
Court with a more objective framework based on being “obvious . . . to
a person having ordinary skill in the art,” which they embodied in 35
U.S.C. § 103.12 This new framework proved very useful and set the stage
for the Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere Co.,13 to develop the
standards necessary to analyze cases against that framework, setting the
modern obviousness test by which the courts and USPTO would judge
patents. As a result of this effort, the doctrine of non-obviousness, and
the doctrine of novelty have formed the cornerstone of modern
patentability.
5. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 8-9 (“[Jefferson] rejected a natural-rights theory in
intellectual property rights and clearly recognized the social and economic rationale of the
patent system. The patent monopoly was not designed to secure to the inventor his natural
right in his discoveries. Rather, it was a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new
knowledge.”).
6. See id. at 9 (“Only inventions and discoveries which furthered human knowledge,
and were new and useful, justified the special inducement of a limited private monopoly.
Jefferson did not believe in granting patents for small details, obvious improvements, or
frivolous devices.”).
7. See O’Reilly, 56 U.S. at 113.
8. David K. Mroz & Umber Aggarwal, Patent Law Could Use Another Judge Rich
Right
Now,
FINNEGAN
(Nov./Dec.
2017),
https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/articles/patent-law-could-use-another-judge-richright-now.html.
9. Cuno Eng’g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84 (1941).
10. Id. at 91 (“That is to say the new device, however useful it may be, must reveal the
flash of creative genius not merely the skill of the calling. If it fails, it has not established its
right to a private grant on the public domain”).
11. Mroz & Aggarwal, supra note 8.
12. Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 103, 66 Stat. 792, 798 (1952).
13. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
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Courts find themselves struggling to formulate reasonable and
predictable tests once again, but this time it is around subject matter
eligibility. The Court has long recognized that implied in the subject
matter eligibility framework of 35 U.S.C. §101 is the recognition that
some subject matter—abstract ideas, natural phenomenon, and laws of
nature—are so fundamental to science that patenting them would
preempt the future progress of science.14 However, courts have
struggled to distinguish when a claim crosses the line from patent
eligible subject matter to cover subject matter that should be deemed
patent ineligible. Under the modern framework, the Supreme Court
supplied a two-part test in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank (“Alice”).15 Under
this test the court first considers whether the claim is “directed to”
ineligible subject matter, and, if so, whether the claim recites an
“inventive concept” that “transform[s] the nature of the claim” into
patent-eligible subject matter.16 However, since the Alice decision, the
patent system has struggled to consistently and reliably apply this
framework to determine when a patent is directed to patent eligible
subject matter or not.17 As Judge Plager of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit said, “[t]here is little consensus among trial judges (or
appellate judges for that matter) regarding whether a particular case will
prove to have a patent with claims directed to an abstract idea, and if so,
whether there is an ‘inventive concept’ in the patent to save it.”18
This uncertainty has not gone unnoticed by litigators. There has
been a ten-fold increase in the number of claims deemed ineligible under
35 U.S.C. § 101 (“§ 101”), and a nine-fold increase in the number of
patents invalidated.19 Many commenters, echoing concerns leading up
to the 1952 Act, have argued the court has once again created a
subjective, and at times arbitrary, test for measuring patentability.20 As
14. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012).
15. Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
16. Id. at 217.
17. See generally Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 927 F.3d
1333 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (en banc) (containing eight separate opinions disagreeing on the
application of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Section 101 jurisprudence with four concurring with
the en banc denial and another four dissenting from the decision); Daniel R. Cahoy, Patently
Uncertain, 17 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 2 (2019) (statement of Hon. Paul R. Michel
(Ret.)) (“I spent twenty-two years on the Federal Circuit and nine years since dealing with
patent cases, and I cannot predict in a given case whether eligibility will be found or not
found.”).
18. Cahoy, supra note 17, at 38.
19. See Dani Kass, Alice Axed Claims From Over 1,000 Patents In 5 Years: Study,
LAW360 (Sept. 3, 2019, 10:10 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1194300/alice-axedclaims-from-over-1-000-patents-in-5-years-study.
20. See generally INTELLECTUAL PROP. OWNERS ASS’N, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO
PATENT ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2017) [hereinafter IPOA].

2021]

PREEMPTION AND § 101 SUBJECT MATTER ANALYSIS

907

they point out, Alice has blurred the lines between subject matter analysis
of § 101 and the non-obvious/novelty analysis of § 102 and § 103, and
worse yet, imported an inventiveness standard reminiscent of the
standard the 1952 Act sought to abolish.21
While these are valid concerns, the more fundamental issue, and the
one this Article focuses on, is that the framework established in Alice
relies on a fundamental assumption that the subject matter eligibility
doctrine—a doctrine concerned with what subject matter should receive
protection—can and should be used to address issues relating to
preemption—a doctrine concerned with not patenting the future. This
Article recognizes that the two doctrines have largely co-existed for over
200 years. However, this coexistence has been due to the courts laissez
faire approach to subject matter eligibility.22 But recent case law has
brought new life to the subject matter eligibility analysis and has started
to show the incompatibilities of the two doctrines.
Since Alice, there has been a considerable amount of scholarly work
focusing on how the decision has blurred the lines between subject
matter analysis and the non-obvious/novelty analysis.23 However, there
has been far less discussion exploring the mixing of preemption analysis
with subject matter analysis. This Article is timely as the courts and
Congress continue to struggle with the subject matter eligibility
framework introduced by Alice.24
This Article contends that the fundamental issue of the modern
subject matter analysis framework is that it mixes the subject matter
eligibility analysis with the preemption analysis, and that the objectives
of the two analysis are inherently incompatible. Part II of this Article
reviews the history of patent invalidation, starting with the history that
culminated in the 1952 Act. This period of time is instructive as many
of the issues that existed at that time parallel the issues faced by the
patent system now, and the objective framework introduced by the 1952
21. See id. at 3.
22. KEVIN J. HICKEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45918, PATENT-ELIGIBLE SUBJECT
MATTER REFORM IN THE 116TH CONGRESS 15 (2019) (“Development of the patent-eligible
subject matter law was primarily left to the Federal Circuit, whose decisions generally
expanded patentable-eligible subject matter, such that by the late 1990s Section 101 became
perceived as ‘a dead letter.’ ” ).
23. See generally IPOA, supra note 20.
24. See, e.g., Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 927 F.3d
1333 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (en banc) (providing a fractured opinion on the proper application of
the Supreme Court’s Section 101 jurisprudence); see also Press Release, Thom Tillis U.S.
Senator for N.C., Sens. Tillis and Coons and Reps. Collins, Johnson, and Stivers Release
Section
101
Patent
Reform
Framework
(Apr.
17,
2019),
https://www.tillis.senate.gov/2019/4/sens-tillis-and-coons-and-reps-collins-johnson-andstivers-release-section-101-patent-reform-framework.
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Act can likely serve as a starting point for developing a new framework
for measuring preemption. The section then moves to the more recent
challenges around subject matter eligibility, and the modern case law
that has culminated in the Alice/Mayo framework for subject matter
analysis. Finally, the section discusses some of the criticism of the
framework and potential congressional reform proposed by Senators
Tillis and Coons.
Part III of this Article looks at two doctrines that have formed the
foundation of subject matter analysis: the judicial exceptions doctrine
and the preemption doctrine. The section starts off with a discussion on
the origins of each doctrine and shows that while the two have
historically been intermixed, the objectives that each are intended to
progress are quite different. Further, the section contends that because
the preemption doctrine conditions patentability on only covering what
is known, and not whether it is directed to a particular subject matter, it
is wholly inappropriate to form part of the subject matter analysis
framework. Building off that distinction, the section then tries to address
the question of why the two doctrines became intermixed. Finally, the
section concludes with highlighting the key issues that have resulted
from intermixing the two doctrines paying particular attention to the
court’s use of concepts of novelty and non-obviousness as a proxy for
addressing the objectives of the preemption doctrine.
Building on the premise that the preemption doctrine and subject
matter eligibility have two distinct objectives, Part IV focuses on
creating a framework that can adequately address the objectives of both
doctrines. This section first contends that because subject matter
eligibility is concerned with distinguishing applications from principles
and the preemption doctrine is concerned with not protecting the
unknown, the two doctrines are inherently incompatible, and should not
form the same analysis. The section then moves on to establish a new
framework to analyze claims by. The framework moves the preemption
analysis to after the initial § 101 threshold test and introduces an
objective standard to measure claims by. Finally, the section concludes
with several examples illustrating how the framework would work in
practice.
II. BACKGROUND
The challenges facing the U.S. patent system are nothing new. The
Court’s focus on invalidating patents often tracks with public sentiment
towards the patent system. Whether this is the court recognizing a flaw
in the patent system, or simply the court reflecting the mood of society
is beyond the scope of this Article. But what is clear is that while the
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Court’s increased attention on the patent system can be challenging at
first, such pushes have helped the patent system to progress from being
a convoluted and muddied body of law, reminiscent of its English
origins,25 to a body of law that is predictable and efficiently progresses
science.
A. The Inventiveness Issue
The depression of the 1890s would cast an unfavorable light on the
patent system. The monopolistic practices of big companies had resulted
in the dire economic crisis that the United States was facing and patents
were perceived as promoting that system.26 Many people strongly
opposed the patent system, and courts reflected that sentiment through
frequent invalidation of patents.27 Congress’s response at that time was
to target the monopolistic practices of the big companies through the
enactment of the Sherman Antitrust Act, leaving the patent system
largely unaffected.28
However, following the Great Depression, the Court would once
again set its sights on the patent system. During this period, the courts
routinely invalidated patents relying on a concept of inventiveness that
was not only subjective, but at times arbitrary.29 Eventually, the Court
settled on an “inventive genius” test.30 The test proved hard to manage
in practice and created an “ever-widening gulf” between the Patent
Office and the courts.31 The disparity between patents the USPTO
deemed valid and patents the Court deemed invalid came to a head in the
famous case of Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp.,
where Justice Douglas declared that a patent “however useful it may be,
must reveal the flash of creative genius, not merely the skill of the
calling.”32 This statement ignited a vigorous debate in the patent
community with Justice Jackson famously commenting “that the only

25. H. Jared Doster, The English Origins of the Judicial Exceptions to 35 U.S.C. § 101,
A.B.A.
(Mar./Apr.
2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/intellectual_property_law/publications/landslide/201819/march-april/english-origins-judicial-exceptions-35-usc-section-101/.
26. See A brief history of the patent law of the United States, LADAS & PARRY (May 7,
2014), https://ladas.com/a-brief-history-of-the-patent-law-of-the-united-states-2/.
27. Id.; see also Christopher Beauchamp, The First Patent Litigation Explosion, 125
YALE L. J. 848 (2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2699964.
28. See A brief history of the patent law of the United States, supra note 26.
29. See IPOA, supra note 20, at 3; see also Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The New United States
Patent Act in the Light of Comparative Law I, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 291, 307-08 (1954).
30. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 148 n.1, 154
(1950).
31. Riesenfeld, supra note 29, at 308.
32. Id. at 307; Cuno Eng’g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941).
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patent that is valid is one which this Court has not been able to get its
hands on.”33
In response, Congress enacted the Patent Act of 1952 to realign the
Patent Office and the courts. The 1952 Act formalized the concept of
inventiveness, providing an objective framework for its measurement.34
While at first it was unclear whether the 1952 Act would have the
stabilizing effect that Congress intended,35 the Supreme Court in
Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City laid those concerns to rest.36
In its decision, the Court set the stage for our modern understanding of
non-obviousness which has become the cornerstone of patent
eligibility.37 In its decision, the Court first recognized that 35 U.S.C. §
103 codified one hundred years of judicial precedent on determining
inventiveness and made it an express condition on patentability.38
Second, the Court recognized that the statute abolished the controversial
“flash of creative genius” test.39
While, the 1952 Act did not address all questions of patentability,
in particular those around what it means to be obvious,40 the Court
believed those difficulties were comparable to ones “encountered daily
by the courts in such frames of reference as negligence and scienter, and
[would] be amenable to a case-by-case development.”41 In its decision,
the Court foresaw a “uniformity and definiteness which Congress called
for in the 1952 Act” so long as the courts strictly adhered to the
requirements set forth in Graham.42 A vision that would turn out to be
true.

33. Riesenfeld, supra note 29, at 308.
34. Id. at 308-09 (“Section 103 fixes an objective standard of invention by specifying on
the one hand that ‘a patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would
have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the
art to which said subject matter pertains,’ and by declaring on the other hand that ‘patentability
shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.’ In addition, the new
act elevates the presumption of validity to the dignity of a statutory mandate.”).
35. Id. at 309 (“Whether these provisions will have the desired ‘stabilizing effect’
remains to be seen . . . . Perhaps the most that can be said is that Congress has ‘expressed a
mood.’ ” ).
36. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1966).
37. See id. at 13-14.
38. Id. at 14.
39. Id. at 15.
40. Id. at 18.
41. Id.
42. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966).
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B. The Subject Matter Issue
By the 1990s, the United States saw an explosion in the number of
patents granted that mirrored the explosion in technology.43 However,
the economic woes following the bursting of the dot-com bubble, and
subsequent emergence of entities whose sole purpose was asserting
patents obtained from these defunct companies at fire sale prices would
once again sour public sentiment towards the patent system.44 Many
argued that the patent system was replete with examples of overly broad
claims that resulted from the liberal grant of patents during the explosion
in the 1990s.45 In response, the Court, relying on earlier case law, began
a campaign to invalidate these broad patents by focusing on subject
matter eligibility.46 The rationale being that an overly broad claim
directed to ineligible subject matter is a patent on the ineligible subject
matter itself.
1. Initial Subject Matter Analysis
The first Supreme Court case to take on the issue in this period was
Bilski v. Kappos.47 The claim in Bilski was directed to a method for
hedging against price-fluctuations in the energy and commodity
markets.48 While the Court recognized that “[h]edging is a fundamental
economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce and taught
in any introductory finance class,”49 which would have likely served as
a valid ground for invalidation under novelty, it did not consider whether
the patent was invalid on novelty or non-obviousness grounds. Rather,
because § 101 patent-eligibility inquiry is a threshold test, the Court only
needed to consider the other requirements of patentability only if §101
was satisfied.50 Relying on earlier precedent, the Court determined the
concept of hedging was “an unpatentable abstract idea,” as the claims
were so broad that they would preempt use of the abstract idea in all
fields and would in effect grant a monopoly on the idea itself.51
43. PETER MENELL ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL
AGE: 2018: PERSPECTIVES, TRADE SECRETS, PATENTS 282 (2018).
44. Id.
45. See Beauchamp, supra note 27, at 850.
46. See Erin E. Block & Eric Chadwick, Subject Matter Eligibility post Alice: A Boon
Or A Bane For Tech Companies?, HENNEPIN COUNTY BAR ASS’N,
https://www.mnbar.org/hennepin-county-bar-association/resources/hennepinlawyer/articles/2020/02/04/subject-matter-eligibility-post-alice-a-boon-or-a-bane-for-techcompanies.
47. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
48. Id. at 599.
49. Id. at 611.
50. Id. at 602.
51. Id. at 611-12.
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The Supreme Court was not alone and Congress also responded to
concerns about overly broad patents by introducing the biggest reforms
to patent law since the Patent Act of 1952 with the America Invents Act
(AIA).52 Congress’s approach was to improve the efficiency of
invalidating patents by creating a new administrative law body, the
Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), with the purpose to decide issues
of patentability, and add more trial like administrative procedures,
including post-grant review (PGR), and inter partes review (IPR).53
However, while the AIA may have created a more efficient process for
invalidation,54 it did not substantively change or clarify the law around
what constitutes a valid patent.55 This would be left to the courts.
2. Modern Alice/Mayo Framework
Following the AIA, the Supreme Court heard Mayo Collaborative
Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. (“Mayo”).56 The Court’s
rationale in Mayo is of particular interest as it served as the basis for the
Court’s decision in Alice and would form the foundation of what became
the Alice/Mayo test for subject matter eligibility. 57 The claim in Mayo
was directed to a method for optimizing dosage of thiopurine drugs for
treating autoimmune diseases by administering the drug, measuring a
metabolite, and adjusting the dosage based on that measurement.58
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Bryer held that the
invention was directed to patent ineligible subject matter—a law of
nature.59 The Court reiterated earlier warnings that overly broad patents
risk preempting future development and “that a process that focuses
upon the use of a natural law [must] also contain other elements or a
combination of elements, sometimes referred to as an ‘inventive
concept,’ sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to
significantly more than a patent upon the natural law itself.”60 To reach
52. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
53. See id. §§ 6-7.
54. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, COMMERCE, RULES OF PRACTICE FOR TRIALS
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF PATENT TRIAL
AND
APPEAL
BOARD
DECISIONS
2
(2012),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/aia_implementation/general_trial_rules.pdf (“The
purpose of the AIA . . . is to establish a more efficient and streamlined patent system that will
improve patent quality and limit unnecessary and counterproductive litigation costs”).
55. One notable exception is the AIA changing the U.S. patent system from a first-toinvent to a first-to-file system. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 3.
56. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
57. Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014); see HICKEY, supra note 22,
at 16.
58. Mayo Collaborative Services, 566 U.S. at 72.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 72-73.
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its conclusion, the Court first noted the claims “set forth laws of nature—
namely, relationships between concentrations of certain metabolites in
the blood and the likelihood that a dosage of a thiopurine drug will prove
ineffective or cause harm,”61 and that the question was whether the
patent claims “add enough” to the natural law for the process to qualify
as patentable subject matter.62 In addressing this question, the Court
reviewed the claim on an element by element basis finding that each
element was “well-understood, routine, conventional activity already
engaged in by the scientific community” and “when viewed as a whole,
add nothing significant beyond the sum of their parts taken separately.”63
By its analysis, what the Court had done, was to set a rule that if a claim
recites a law of nature, it is presumptively invalid, and the claim must
recite something novel for it to be classified as patent eligible subject
matter. A formulation that continues to be criticized.64
In Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, the Court would solidify the Mayo
decision as a two-part test and extend it to abstract ideas. The Court
considered whether a patent directed to system for mitigating
“settlement risk” was an abstract idea.65 Largely relying on Bilski, the
Court first held that the patent was directed to an abstract idea.66 It noted
that similar to risk hedging in Bilski, “the concept of intermediated
settlement is ‘a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our
system of commerce.’ ” 67 Similar to Bilski, the Court did not consider
whether the patent should have been invalidated on novelty or nonobviousness grounds. In addition, the Court took the position that a
longstanding fundamental practice is an abstract idea.68
The Court, echoing Mayo, noted that the second step of the analysis
is the search for an “inventive concept” that is “sufficient to ‘transform’
the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.”69 However,
instead of relying on the well settled law of non-obviousness in § 103 to
determine the inventive concept, the Court proceeded through a more
comparative analysis by measuring the claim in question against other §

61. Id. at 77.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 79-80.
64. See generally Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v.
Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 927 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (en banc); IPOA, supra note
20.
65. Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 213 (2014).
66. Id. at 218-20.
67. Id. at 219.
68. Id. at 220 (“[A]ll of the claims at issue [in Bilski] were abstract ideas in the
understanding that risk hedging was a ‘fundamental economic practice.’ ” ).
69. Id. at 221.
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101 decisions.70 Relying on those decisions, the Court ultimately found
that the implementation of a generic computer did not transform the
ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.71
While the Mayo decision would have a substantial impact on the
examination of medical diagnostic applications,72 the Alice decision had
far broader implications. Not only did applicants see a sharp increase in
§101 rejections at the USPTO, particularly in the computer science
fields,73 but the number of issued patents deemed invalid increased tenfold.74 Not surprisingly, litigators have tried to use the increase in
invalidation to their advantage, and have stepped up their §101 attacks
in the courts.75 In response to the challenges applicants faced at the
USPTO, Director Andrei Iancu has issued a number of guidelines to
assist both applicants and examiners.76 Whether or not these guidelines
have helped still remains to be seen; however, it is clear that their reach
in alleviating the issues faced by patent holders in the courts is limited,
or worse yet, counter-productive.77
3. Criticism of Alice/Mayo Framework
The Alice/Mayo framework has been praised for reducing the
number of overly broad patents.78 However, it has also received a
substantial amount of criticism.79 One criticism is targeted particularly
at Mayo for having a detrimental impact on innovation. 80 Many have

70. See IPOA, supra note 20, at 16 (“But [the Court] did not simply import the
longstanding obviousness standard under § 103 into the § 101 analysis. Rather, the ‘inventive
concept’ analysis appears to be a far more arbitrary exercise, dependent on comparisons of
the claims at issue to claims in other § 101 opinions.”).
71. Alice Corp. Pty., 573 U.S. at 226-27.
72. See Colleen Chien, The Impact of 101 on Patent Prosecution, PATENTLY-O (Oct. 21,
2018), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/10/impact-patent-prosecution.html (“[Among
medical diagnostic applications] the 101 rejection rate grew from 7% to 32% in the month
after the Mayo decision and continued to climb to a high of 64%”).
73. Id.
74. IPOA, supra note 20, at 22 (noting that patent invalidations increased from an
average of one to five per quarter prior to the Alice decision to almost fifty patents per quarter
following Alice).
75. See Kass, supra note 19.
76. See e.g., Notice, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019).
77. See Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, 760 Fed. Appx. 1013,
1020 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“While we greatly respect the PTO’s expertise on all matters relating
to patentability, including patent eligibility, we are not bound by its guidance.”).
78. Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 927 F.3d 1333, 1337
(Fed. Cir. 2019) (Dyk, J., concurring).
79. See HICKEY, supra note 22, at 20-23.
80. See IPOA, supra note 20, at 2; HICKEY, supra note 22, at 22.
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argued Mayo has created a per se rule against diagnostic devices,81 as
they are directed at a law of nature —the detection of the law of nature—
and use “data gathering steps or devices that can be said to be basic,
conventional, or obvious.”82 But, as Justice Chen noted, these devices
“intuitively seem to be the kind of subject matter the patent system is
designed for.”83
That is, “to encourage the risky, expensive,
unpredictable technical research and development that people would not
otherwise pursue in the hope that if they discover something of great
medical value, then they will be protected and rewarded for that
successful effort with a patent.”84
Critics have also argued that the uncertainty caused by the
Alice/Mayo framework has put the United States at a disadvantage to its
competitors.85 One rationale is that the current state of patentability in
the U.S. after Alice has created what one commenter has dubbed
“investment-killing” uncertainty.86 Only after sinking considerable
costs into the development of an invention along with the costs of
prosecution and maintenance, has the investor found that, not only are
they unable to protect their investment against infringers, but their
invention has been contributed to the public as a result of the required
disclosure.87 Given that there is little consensus among the judges (trial
or appellate) about whether a given claim is subject matter eligible, there
is little an investor can do to minimize the risk caused by this
uncertainty.88 At best, the patent system becomes a pure gamble for the
inventor.
Critics have also pointed out that not only does the framework
hinder innovation, it is also legally flawed.89 The congressional intent
of 35 U.S.C. § 101 reflects Jefferson’s belief that innovation should be
liberally rewarded.90 The Alice/Mayo framework, in contrast, introduces
“extra-statutory” requirements that significantly limit what is classified
as patentable subject matter which some argue is “contrary to
congressional intent or the constitutional purpose of patent law.”91 In
81. See Athena Diagnostics, Inc., 927 F.3d at 1350 (“[T]he Supreme Court has made
clear that detecting a law of nature (without more than conventional steps for accessing the
law of nature) does not qualify as a patent-eligible application of a law of nature.”).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1352.
84. Id.
85. HICKEY, supra note 22, at 22-23.
86. Cahoy, supra note 17, at 6.
87. See id. at 14-17.
88. See id.
89. HICKEY, supra note 22, at 21-22.
90. Id. at 1.
91. HICKEY, supra note 22, at 21.
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addition, the Alice/Mayo framework undermines the intent of the 1952
Act by intermixing elements of novelty and non-obviousness with the
subject matter analysis.92
While the Alice/Mayo framework may be helpful in invalidating
patents that are particularly low quality,93 it has come at the expense of
also invalidating countless other patents.94 The issues facing the
Alice/Mayo framework raises serious questions about whether it will be
part of subject matter eligibility analysis of the future, or whether it will
face the same fate as the “flash of creative genius” test articulated in
Cuno.95
Many agreed that Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo
Collaborative Services, LLC (“Athena”),96 was the opportunity for the
Supreme Court to salvage the Alice/Mayo framework and add much
needed clarity to the subject matter analysis.97 However, the Court
refused to hear the case, and it seems to have left it to Congress to bring
much needed changes to the 35 U.S.C. § 101.98
4. Potential Congressional Reform
In an attempt to reform § 101, Senators Thom Tillis and Chris
Coons revived the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Intellectual
Property.99 On April 17, 2019, they “released a bipartisan, bicameral
framework on Section 101 patent reform” which was later revised on
May 22, 2019 after receiving feedback.100 But while the Tillis-Coons
framework is a recognition that § 101 needs reform, it may be years
before it will have any effect, if ever. After a considerable amount of
effort, no draft bill is in sight, and while the bill is not dead per se, it is
92. See generally IPOA, supra note 20.
93. Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 927 F.3d 1333, 1337
(Fed. Cir. 2019) (Dyk, J., concurring).
94. IPOA, supra note 20, at 26 (“Using section 101 to invalidate poor quality patents is
like using a sledgehammer to crack walnuts: it’s hard to stop the damage at just the shell.
What distinguishes a good quality patent from a bad one is unrelated to the requirements of
eligibility”).
95. See id. at 5.
96. Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 927 F.3d 1333 (Fed.
Cir. 2019) (en banc).
97. See Ryan Davis, Fed. Circ. Pleads For Patent Eligibility Clarity: What Now?,
LAW360 (July 10, 2019, 9:13 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1176454.
98. Eileen McDermott, It’s Official: SCOTUS Will Not Unravel Section 101 Web,
IPWATCHDOG (Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/01/13/scotus-will-notunravel-section-101-web/id=117800/.
99. Press Release, Patent Reform Framework, supra note 24.
100. Id.; Press Release, Thom Tillis U.S. Senator for N.C., Sens. Tillis and Coons and
Reps. Collins, Johnson, and Stivers Release Draft Bill Text to Reform Section 101 of the
Patent Act (May 22, 2019), https://www.tillis.senate.gov/2019/5/sens-tillis-and-coons-andreps-collins-johnson-and-stivers-release-draft-bill-text-to-reform-section-101-of-the-patentact.
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“on life support.”101 The main obstacle holding up the bill is reaching a
consensus on the statutory language.102
However, a more fundamental issue with the Tillis-Coons bill, and
the majority of discussions around § 101 reform, is the inability to
reconcile two competing objectives that currently exist in subject matter
analysis. The first objective embodied in the original Congressional
intent of § 101 is to promote the progress of science through the liberal
reward of inventiveness. The second objective embodied in the
preemption doctrine is to prevent hindering the progress of science by
granting a reward that is too broad. Historically, both objectives have
been reflected in the subject matter analysis of 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, except in the most extreme cases, the courts have struggled to
adequately satisfy both objectives in a single test. The remainder of this
Article focuses on identifying the root cause of the issues and proposing
a framework that would progress both objectives.
III. PREEMPTION ANALYSIS IS DISTINCT FROM SUBJECT MATTER
ELIGIBILITY
The judicial exceptions have been part of the U.S. patent system
since the mid-nineteenth century and trace their origins to the English
courts where they were imported into U.S. law by the Court in Le Roy v.
Tatham.103 From the outset, the court recognized that while abstract
principles, and natural laws are not patentable, the applications may
be.104 For 120 years, subject matter eligibility was a relative low bar to
overcome, and “merely required that the patentee ‘carry the principle
into effect, however simple and self-evident such means may be.’ ” 105
While principles that underlie preemption would occasionally be used to
justify classifying a claim as a judicial exception, they generally were
not used to distinguish a principle from its application.106
101. Richard Lloyd, Even if you forget about 101 reform, don’t forget about DC, IAM
(Dec. 14, 2019), https://www.iam-media.com/frandseps/even-if-you-forget-about-101reform-dont-forget-about-dc.
102. Id.
103. Doster, supra note 25; HICKEY, supra note 22, at 12-13 (“Le Roy relied on influential
English patent cases to set forth a basic distinction between abstract ‘principles’ and natural
laws (which may not be patented) and practical applications of those principles (which may
be patented).”); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (1852).
104. Doster, supra note 25; HICKEY, supra note 22, at 11-12.
105. MENELL ET AL., supra note 43, at 277.
106. See, e.g., Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948)
(“Discovery of the fact that certain strains of each species of these bacteria can be mixed
without harmful effect to the properties of either is a discovery of their qualities of noninhibition.”); Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939) (“[The
Court assume[d], without deciding the point, that [the] advance was [an] invention even
though it was achieved by the logical application of a known scientific law to a familiar type
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However, the Court would change this long-standing position in its
first case to consider subject matter eligibility following the 1952 Act.
In Gottschalk v. Benson,107 the Court declared that the claim was
ineligible because it was “so abstract and sweeping as to cover both
known and unknown uses of the [principle]” and that if the patent were
to be upheld, it “would wholly pre-empt the [principle] and in practical
effect would be a patent on the [principle] itself.”108 The analysis in
Benson has complicated patent law as it is not clear at what point claim
breadth crosses the line from covering a principle to covering its
application. Recent cases such as Alice and Mayo have tried to address
this question, but they have come up short. This section contends that
the Court’s failure is a direct result of trying to apply principles of
preemption and claim breadth to address issues of subject matter
eligibility.
A. Subject Matter Eligibility—Judicial Exceptions
The principles of subject matter eligibility are embodied in § 101
and reflect the idea that inventiveness should be liberally rewarded.109
However, the court has long recognized that implicit in § 101 is the
principle that some subject matter is so fundamental to science that
society never benefits if it is excluded.110 The foundation of the judicial

of antenna.”); Am. Fruit Growers v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1931) (“Addition of borax
to the rind of natural fruit does not produce from the raw material an article for use which
possesses a new or distinctive form, quality, or property.”); Dolbear v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 126
U.S. 1, 534 (1888) (“In the present case the claim is not for the use of a current of electricity
in its natural state as it comes from the battery, but for putting a continuous current, in a closed
circuit, into a certain specified condition, suited to the transmission of vocal and other sounds,
and using it in that condition for that purpose.”); Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 726-7
(1880) (clarifying that the claim in question in O’Reily v. Morse was invalidated because “[i]t
was not a claim of any particular machinery, nor a claim of any particular process for utilizing
the [natural phenomenon]; but a claim of the [natural phenomenon] itself”); Corning v.
Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 263 (1853) (“ ‘ A mere principle . . . is an abstract discovery; but a
principle, so far embodied and connected with corporeal substances as to be in a condition to
act and produce effects in any art, trade, mystery, or manual occupation, becomes the practical
manner of doing a practical thing. It is no longer a principle, but a process.’ ” ); O’Reilly v.
Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 120 (1853) (“That is to say—[Morse] claims a patent, for an effect
produced by the use of electro-magnetism distinct from the process or machinery necessary
to produce it.”).
107. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
108. Id. at 68-72.
109. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601 (2010) (“In choosing such expansive terms . . .
modified by the comprehensive ‘any,’ Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws
would be given wide scope. Congress took this permissive approach to patent eligibility to
ensure that ‘ingenuity should receive a liberal encouragement.’ ” ).
110. See, e.g., Neilson v. Harford (1841) 151 Eng. Rep. 1266, 1270 (noting that inventors
have “no right to take out [a] patent for a general notion or principle”); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55
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exceptions is that “[t]he concepts covered by these exceptions are ‘part
of the storehouse of knowledge of all men . . . free to all men and
reserved exclusively to none,’ ” 111 and any invention must come from its
application.112
For example, in Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.,113 the
Court considered whether a patent directed to selecting strains of
bacteria for “leguminous plants” such that they did not inhibit each other
was patent eligible.114 At the outset of its opinion, the Court noted that
the inventor did not modify the bacteria in any way to generate the
inhibition, rather the inhibition was a product of nature.115 The Court
continued, that the products of nature such as “the heat of the sun,
electricity, or the qualities of metals, are part of the storehouse of
knowledge of all men . . . free to all men and reserved exclusively to
none.”116 As a result, the Court held that the claim was patent ineligible
as the combination “produces no new bacteria [and] no change in the six
species of bacteria,” and the discovery was only for “some of the
handiwork of nature and hence is not patentable.”117
Thirty-two years later, the Supreme Court would decide the
companion case, Diamond v. Chakrabarty.118 In Chakrabarty the Court
considered whether a “human-made, genetically engineered bacterium
capable of breaking down crude oil” was patentable subject matter.119
Echoing Funk Bros., the Court noted that “a new mineral discovered in
the earth or a new plant found in the wild is not patentable subject
matter” as “[s]uch discoveries are ‘manifestations of. . . nature, free to
all men and reserved exclusively to none.’ ” 120 However, unlike Funk
Bros., the claim in question was not to an “unknown natural
phenomenon, but to a non-naturally occurring manufacture or
composition of matter—a product of human ingenuity ‘having a
U.S. 156, 175 (1852) (“A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause;
a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right”).
111. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 602.
112. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
113. Funk Bros. Seed Co., 333 U.S. 127
114. Id. at 128 n.1 (“The product claims in suit are 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, and 14. Claim 4
is illustrative of the invention which is challenged. It reads as follows: ‘An inoculant for
leguminous plants comprising a plurality of selected mutually non-inhibitive strains of
different species of bacteria of the genus Rhizobium, said strains being unaffected by each
other in respect to their ability to fix nitrogen in the leguminous plant for which they are
specific.’ ” )
115. Id. at 130.
116. Id.
117. HICKEY, supra note 22, at 14; Funk Bros. Seed Co., 333 U.S. at 130-32.
118. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
119. Id. at 303.
120. Id. at 309.
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distinctive name, character [and] use.’ ” 121 As a result, the Court held
that the claim did not cover a judicial exception as the bacteria was
human-made and possessed “markedly different characteristics from any
[bacteria] found in nature.”122
Funk Bros. and Chakrabarty represent the underlying principles of
the judicial exceptions which is that some subject matter is so
fundamental that it would be inappropriate to limit societies access to it.
These are the “building blocks” of science, contained in the “storehouse
of knowledge,” that should be “free to all men and reserved exclusively
to none.”123
B. Preemption
In contrast to the judicial exceptions, the fundamental premise
behind preemption is that an inventor should only be rewarded for what
they create and not for what is unknown.124 The rationale being that
granting such a right would prevent future improvements on the
technology, limiting the progress of science.125 In one of the earliest and
most influential cases on the subject, Chief Justice Taney stated in
O’Reilly v. Morse,126 a case concerning Samuel Morse’s invention of the
telegraph:
For aught that we now know some future inventor, in the onward
march of science, may discover a mode of writing or printing at a
distance by means of the electric or galvanic current, without using
any part of the process or combination set forth in the plaintiff’s
specification. His invention may be less complicated—less liable to
get out of order—less expensive in construction, and in its operation.
But yet if it is covered by this patent the inventor could not use it,
nor the public have the benefit of it without the permission of this
patentee.127

121. Id. at 309-10.
122. Id. at 310.
123. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948); Berkheimer
v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 208-09 (2014).
124. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 68 (1972) (“Here the ‘process’ claim is so
abstract and sweeping as to cover both known and unknown uses of the BCD to pure binary
conversion. The end use may (1) vary from the operation of a train to verification of drivers’
licenses to researching the law books for precedents and (2) be performed through any existing
machinery or future-devised machinery or without any apparatus.”).
125. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012)
(“[B]asic tools of scientific and technological work’ . . . might tend to impede innovation more
than it would tend to promote it.”).
126. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853).
127. Id. at 113.
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More recently, the Supreme Court has echoed these same principles
in Gottschalk v. Benson, which considered a “method for converting
binary-coded decimal numerals into pure binary numerals” for use with
general purpose computers.128 The Court found the claim drafted in such
broad terms as to cover both “known and unknown uses” with such uses
“vary[ing] from the operation of a train to verification of drivers’
licenses to researching the law books for precedents” or “be performed
through any existing machinery or future-devised machinery or without
any apparatus.”129
What the case law has shown is that preemption analysis, at its core,
is a question of claim scope. Is the claim narrow enough to cover only
what is known to the inventor or is it so broad as to preempt future
development by covering both the known and unknown applications?
This objective is far more aligned with the written description
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) than it is the subject matter eligibility
of § 101.130 Despite this, courts have routinely mixed preemption
analysis with subject matter analysis.131 The literature is not clear why
the courts have taken this approach. It may be partly historical, as
preemption has been used since O’Reilly v. Morse to justify the judicial
exceptions.132 It may also be one of utility, as preemption has had
success in distinguishing principles from applications in extreme
cases.133 However, whatever the reason, the objectives of the two
doctrines are quite distinct, and as recent case law suggests,
incompatible.
C. Genesis of Intermixing Preemption and Subject Matter Eligibility
While Morse and Benson are helpful to understand the role
preemption plays in patent analysis, the difficulty with these cases, and
most cases relying on a theory of preemption, is that the preemption
analysis is often intertwined with, and difficult to separate from, the
128. Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 64.
129. Id. at 68.
130. Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, 872 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Section 112 states that
‘[t]he specification shall contain a written description of the invention . . . in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains . . . to
make and use the same . . . .’ This requirement ensures ‘that the inventor actually invented the
invention claimed.’ ” ); Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1330
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (“The purpose of the written description requirement is to prevent an
applicant from later asserting that he invented that which he did not”).
131. See, e.g., Benson, 409 U.S. at 63; Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 66 (2012); Alice Corp. Pty. v.
CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
132. See generally O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853).
133. See generally Benson, 409 U.S. at 63.
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subject matter analysis. For example, in Benson, the Court initially
relied on a preemption style analysis of the claim, noting the claim
covered both “known and unknown uses.”134 However, it built off of
that analysis to review the claim from a subject matter perspective,
concluding the claim “would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula
and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself.”135
There is a distinction in how early case law, and more modern cases
have used preemption in their subject matter analysis. Generally, earlier
cases considered the preemption doctrine to be a justification for
classifying a claim as a principle instead of an application in extreme
cases.136 These cases tend to have more to do with the fact that the claims
are for natural processes, but with some manifestations of a physical
form that make it more difficult to simply classify it as such. Later cases
on the subject have taken a step further from simply using preemption to
justify a classification and incorporated the objectives of the preemption
doctrine into its subject matter eligibility analysis.137 While earlier case
law has shown that combining preemption analysis with subject matter
eligibility can work in the most extreme cases, as evidenced by the 120
years of case precedents,138 extending that approach to analyze cases that
deviate from these extremes has caused considerable issues in the more
modern context.
1. Origins of Issue
The court has long recognized that inventions should be rewarded
not for the discovery of a natural principle, but its application.139 In one
of the cases that was instrumental in shaping patent eligibility doctrine
in the U.S., the English Court of the Exchequer considered whether a
patent for the improvement in the application of air in a bellow driven
furnace was for the discovery that applying hot air to a furnace improved
efficiency—which is a principle—or for the mode of applying the hot
air—its application.140 The court ultimately concluded that, while the
patent was broad, it was directed to the “mode of applying [the principle]

134. Id. at 68.
135. Id. at 72.
136. Id. at 71-72 (“The mathematical formula involved here has no substantial practical
application except in connection with a digital computer, which means that if the judgment
below is affirmed, the patent would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in
practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself.”).
137. See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
138. If you exclude Flook and Benson, the case precedents are far longer.
139. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 160 (1852).
140. Neilson v. Harford (1841) 151 Eng. Rep. 1266, 1266-67.

2021]

PREEMPTION AND § 101 SUBJECT MATTER ANALYSIS

923

by means of a mechanical apparatus to [the] furnace” and therefore a
patent-eligible application. 141
The principle-application distinction from Neilson v. Harford,142
would influence the Supreme Court in Le Roy.143 While the Court did
not decide the case in Le Roy on subject matter grounds, it did import
the distinction of non-patentable natural laws from the practical
application of those principles.144 The Court stated that while a principle
cannot be patented, a “new property discovered in matter, when
practically applied, in the construction of a useful article of commerce
or manufacture, is patentable.”145 As the court noted, “invention is not
in discovering [the natural principles], but in applying them to useful
objects.”146
However, by the 1970s personal computers were emerging and
there was a recognition that these systems significantly blurred the lines
between an unpatentable principle and a patentable application, and a
considerable debate raged as to whether computer programs were
patentable.147 The Court confronted this issue head on in Gottschalk v.
Benson when it considered a claim for a method to convert binary coded
decimal numbers into pure binary numbers using a general purpose
computer.148 While the Court ruled the claim covered unpatentable
subject matter, it did not rule the claim was for an abstract idea.149
Rather, the Court ruled that the claim was “so abstract and sweeping” as
to be in practical effect “a patent on the algorithm itself.”150
To reach this conclusion, the Court had to expand the judicial
exceptions beyond the original three categories—abstract ideas, laws of
nature, and natural phenomenon—to include the equivalents thereof.
While Benson might have been considered on §112 grounds, the
rejection on § 101 grounds reflected a skepticism as to whether computer
programs were patentable in the first place.151 Since Benson, the patent
141. Id.
142. Neilson, 151 Eng. Rep. 1266.
143. See Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852).
144. See id. at 174-75.
145. Id. at 175.
146. Id.
147. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72 (1972) (“Uncertainty now exists as to
whether the statute permits a valid patent to be granted on programs. Direct attempts to patent
programs have been rejected on the ground of nonstatutory subject matter. Indirect attempts
to obtain patents and avoid the rejection, by drafting claims as a process, or a machine or
components thereof programmed in a given manner, rather than as a program itself, have
confused the issue further and should not be permitted.”).
148. Id. at 64.
149. See id. at 68-72.
150. Id.
151. See id. at 72-73.

924

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:61

system has become more accepting of such patents, but Benson has left
a legacy of skepticism towards subject matter eligibility of software
patents. As a result, the Court has relied on, and developed case law
around invalidating suspect patents on subject matter grounds despite the
fact other grounds may be more appropriate or manageable.
2. Parker v. Flook
In Parker v. Flook,152 the Supreme Court built off of its original
expansion of the scope of the judicial exceptions in Benson.153 The claim
in question was directed to a method for dynamically adjusting alarm
limits in the catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons which relied on a
mathematical formula.154 What makes this case particularly fascinating,
and quite distinct from Benson, is the claim did not “wholly preempt the
mathematical formula” since it was only directed to the petrochemical
and oil-refining industries. 155 Yet, despite this, the Court held the claim
was directed to an unpatentable judicial exception.156
To reach its conclusion, the Court deviated substantially from
precedent. Instead of asking whether the claim was so broad as to
effectively be the mathematical formula, as was the case in Benson, the
Court asked whether the “claim’s elements, individually and as an
ordered combination, contain[ed] an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to
transform the claim into patent eligible subject matter.”157 That is, after
removing all that was well known and routine from the claim, if the only
thing left was the mathematical formula, it covered ineligible subject
matter.158 In the case of Flook, the Court found that after removing the
mathematical formula, the claim only consisted of well-known
processes, techniques, and methods and, therefore, must cover ineligible
subject matter.159
Flook has been criticized for its incorporation of elements of
novelty and non-obviousness in its subject matter analysis.160 Yet, more
152. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
153. See generally id.
154. Id. at 585-86.
155. Id. at 589-90.
156. Id. at 594-95.
157. IPOA, supra note 20, at 8.
158. Flook, 437 U.S. at 594 (“Here it is absolutely clear that respondent’s application
contains no claim of patentable invention. The chemical processes involved in catalytic
conversion of hydrocarbons are well known, as are the practice of monitoring the chemical
process variables, the use of alarm limits to trigger alarms, the notion that alarm limit values
must be recomputed and readjusted, and the use of computers for ‘automatic monitoringalarming.’ ” ).
159. See id. at 594-95.
160. IPOA, supra note 20, at 7-9.
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fundamentally what Flook shows is the difficulties with intermixing
preemption analysis with subject matter analysis. The Court having
found that the claim in Flook did not fall into the same extreme category
as Benson, it proceeded to develop a new test relying on the concept of
inventiveness to distinguish an application from a principle.161
However, this approach serves neither the purpose of subject matter
eligibility nor of preemption. First, whether or not elements of a claim
are “novel or independently eligible for patent protection is irrelevant to
the question of whether the claims as a whole recite subject matter
eligible for patent protection under § 101.”162 Similarly, whether a claim
element is inventive is immaterial as to whether the elements add
meaningful limitations to a claims scope.
3. Diamond v. Diehr
Three years after Flook, the Supreme Court appeared to correct the
subject matter analysis in Diamond v. Diehr,163 but they would not
provide any replacement for how to handle overly broad claims.164 The
patent in Diehr was directed to a process for molding rubber that relied
on the Arrhenius equation to determine curing time.165 As the Court
pointed out, when determining subject matter eligibility, the claim
should be “considered as a whole.” 166 It is “inappropriate to dissect the
claims into old and new elements and then to ignore the presence of the
old elements in the analysis.”167 Further, the fact that one or more of the
steps “may not, in isolation, be novel or independently eligible for patent
protection is irrelevant to the question of whether the claims as a whole
recite subject matter eligible for patent protection under § 101.”168
Relying on this framework, the Court concluded that Diehr’s claim
covered patent eligible subject matter. However, instead of overruling
Flook, the Court distinguished Diehr from Flook by noting that, unlike

161. See id. at 7-8.
162. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 193 n.15 (1981).
163. Diamond, 450 U.S. 175.
164. POA, supra note 20, at 9 (“The dissent in Flook became part of the majority in Diehr,
where the Court correctly rejected Flook’s point of novelty approach and its incorporation of
novelty considerations in the eligibility analysis.”); Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo
Collaborative Servs., LLC, 927 F.3d 1333, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (en banc) (“Mayo’s rationale
thus follows the point of novelty/inventive concept reasoning of Flook and the Diehr dissent.
As such, Mayo is in considerable tension with Diehr’s instruction to consider claims ‘as a
whole’ and Diehr’s disapproval of dissecting claims into elements and ignoring non-novel
elements in the § 101 analysis.”).
165. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 177.
166. Id. at 188.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 193 n.15.
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Flook, the patent “do[es] not seek to pre-empt the use of that
equation.”169 But this distinction is rather unsettling as the Flook Court
explicitly acknowledged that the patent did not “wholly preempt the
mathematical formula.”170 To get around this, the Diehr Court classified
this limitation as a field limitation, not accorded any weight in
determining claim scope.171 However, the Court did not provide any
explanation for why such a limitation should not carry any weight. One
possibility is that these types of limitations do not distinguish known and
unknown applications, and preemption would still occur, albeit in a
narrower respect.172 However, this is mere speculation as the Court did
not articulate their rationale.
4. Modern Preemption and Subject Matter Eligibility
After Diehr, the Supreme Court did not decide another subject
matter eligibility case for thirty years, and left the development of the
law to the Federal Circuit.173 During that period, the Federal Circuit,
building off of Diehr, significantly expanded the scope of subject matter
eligibility to such an extent that invalidation due to subject matter
ineligibility was rare.174 However, this changed in 2010 when the
Supreme Court decided four cases in five years, starting with Bilski v.
Kappos and eventually culminating into the Alice/Mayo two-step
analysis.175
In Bilski, the Court concluded that claims directed to the concept of
hedging and its applications were unpatentable subject matter.176 But
despite Diehr’s guidance,177 the Bilski Court imported from Flook the
concept of inventiveness noting that well known techniques do not
transform patentable ineligible subject matter into eligible subject

169. Id. at 176.
170. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978).
171. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191 (“A mathematical formula as such is not accorded the
protection of our patent laws . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to
limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.”).
172. See infra Section IV.B.
173. Diehr was decided in 1981 and the Court would not decide Bilski until 2010.
174. Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1318 (2011)
(“[A]fter 1998, patentable subject matter was effectively a dead letter.”); see also HICKEY,
supra note 22, at 15.
175. HICKEY, supra note 22, at 16.
176. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611-12 (2010).
177. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 193 n.15 (1981) (“The fact that one or more of the
steps . . . may not, in isolation, be novel or independently eligible for patent protection is
irrelevant to the question of whether the claims as a whole recite subject matter eligible for
patent protection under § 101.”).
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matter.178 The Court further embraced this approach in Mayo v.
Prometheus.179 In Mayo, after the Court first quickly concluded that the
claim in question was directed to an unpatentable law of nature, it then
dissected the claims into their component parts and held that each claim
element consisted of “well-understood, routine, conventional activity
already engaged in by the scientific community” that add nothing to the
law of nature.180 The modern framework for subject matter eligibility
analysis was finalized in Alice by the Court implementing a two-step
test.
Under Alice, the first step of the framework is to ask whether the
claim is directed to patent ineligible subject matter.181 To be directed to
a patent ineligible subject matter, the claim as a whole must focus on the
ineligible subject matter, and not just involve the subject matter.182
However, this determination is done in consideration of the state of
art.183 If the claims are directed to ineligible subject matter, the Court
then searches for an “inventive concept” that “ ‘ transform the nature of
the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.”184
The Alice/Mayo framework suffers from the same flaws as Flook
and seems to ignore Diehr’s guidance to view the claim as a whole.185
While “[t]he Court indicated that it had considered the claim ‘as a
whole,’ . . . it did so by reviewing the claim on an element-by-element
basis in search of something new and inventive, discounting the formula
as ‘assumed to be within the prior art.’ ” 186 What this approach does is
ignore meaningful limitations on the application of an abstract idea or
178. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 612 (“These claims attempt to patent the use of the abstract idea
of hedging risk in the energy market and then instruct the use of well-known random analysis
techniques to help establish some of the inputs into the equation”).
179. See generally Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66
(2012).
180. Id. at 79-80.
181. Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 218 (2014) (“We must first
determine whether the claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept.”).
182. Id. at 217 (“At the same time, we tread carefully in construing this exclusionary
principle lest it swallow all of patent law. At some level, ‘all inventions . . . embody, use,
reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.’ Thus, an
invention is not rendered ineligible for patent simply because it involves an abstract
concept.”).
183. IPOA, supra note 20, at 15 (“In its analysis of step one, the Court supported its
conclusion that the claims in Alice were directed to an abstract idea by considering the state
of the art.”).
184. Alice Corp. Pty., 573 U.S. at 217.
185. Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 927 F.3d 1333, 1347
(Fed. Cir. 2019) (Chen, J., concurring) (“As such, Mayo is in considerable tension with
Diehr’s instruction to consider claims ‘as a whole’ and Diehr’s disapproval of dissecting
claims into elements and ignoring non-novel elements in the § 101 analysis.”).
186. Id. at 1344.
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natural principle, and claim that by an application becoming known it
can no longer serve as a claim limitation.
There is no better example of the difficulties that have been caused
by the Alice/Mayo framework than with Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v.
Mayo Collaborative Services (“Athena”).187 The claim in Athena was
directed to a method for diagnosing neurological disorders by detecting
antibodies to the muscle specific tyrosine kinase (MuSK) protein.188 As
Justice Chen noted, this class of patents “intuitively seem to be the kind
of subject matter the patent system is designed for: to encourage the
risky, expensive, unpredictable technical research and development.”189
Yet, following the Mayo framework, “after setting aside the law of
nature, ‘any additional steps consist[ed] of well-understood, routine,
conventional activity already engaged in by the scientific community;
and those steps, when viewed as a whole, add[ed] nothing significant
beyond the sum of their parts taken separately.’ ” 190 That is, once you
remove the natural phenomenon from the equation, all the reviewer is
left with is “well-understood, routine, conventional activities.”
The question is, how do you distinguish cases such as Athena from
cases that simply “implement an abstract idea using a computer,” such
as in Benson? Subject matter alone is wholly inoperative to serve as a
distinguishing factor as both cases are directed to judicial exceptions.191
Further, Athena shows that inventiveness is insufficient as once the court
removes the judicial exception from the analysis, the claims contain only
routine and well-known tools and steps. The distinguishing factor seems
to be one of claim breadth. Does the claim cover both known and
unknown uses so as to prevent future development? In the case of
Athena, the claim is directed to a particularly narrow application for
diagnosing neurological disorders related to MuSK, which, unlike
Flook, intuitively seems to only cover uses known to the inventor.192 The
next section sets forth a framework for analyzing claim breadth and
provides examples of the framework in action.
IV. PATH FORWARD
Most of the focus driving the recent changes to subject matter
eligibility is to combat aggressive enforcement of overly-broad, low187. Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 915 F.3d. 743 (Fed.
Cir. 2019).
188. Id. at 747.
189. Athena Diagnostics, Inc., 927 F.3d at 1352 (Chen, J., concurring).
190. Id. at 1347.
191. See generally IPOA, supra note 20.
192. See Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 915 F.3d. 743, 747
(Fed. Cir. 2019).
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quality patents by non-practicing entities.193 However, the Court has
struggled with creating reliable and predictable tests to invalidate such
low-quality patents.194 As discussed above, the Court has relied on
subject matter eligibility to address issues of claim breadth, with the
rationale being that patents should not be awarded for claims that cover
both the known and unknown. However, to determine when a claim
preempts an unknown application, the Court has relied on inventiveness
concepts, which confuses the issue by mixing in elements of novelty and
obviousness in the analysis.195 Whether a claim is novel or obvious is
irrelevant to whether it claims known and unknown uses. This section
discusses the relevant considerations in developing a new framework for
analyzing claim subject matter eligibility and determining when a claim
is overly broad.
A. Preemption Analysis Should Be Removed from Subject Matter
Analysis
The major issue with preemption and the judicial exceptions is that
the Court has intermixed the two analyses in subject matter eligibility
law. The distinct objectives of the preemption doctrine and judicial
exceptions make it difficult to create a predictable law capable of
reasonably advancing both objectives. At the heart of preemption
analysis is the question of whether the claim covers both known and
unknown applications of a principle. The preemption doctrine
recognizes that by awarding an exclusive right to unknown applications
of an invention, the progress of science is impeded as the inventor
controls the rights of any future developments.196 In contrast, the
objective of the judicial exceptions is to ensure that the fundamental
building blocks of science are not exclusive to any person. 197

193. Athena Diagnostics, Inc., 927 F.3d at 1337 (Hughes, J., concurring) (“I, for one,
would welcome further explication of eligibility standards in the area of diagnostics patents.
Such standards could permit patenting of essential life saving inventions based on natural laws
while providing a reasonable and measured way to differentiate between overly broad patents
claiming natural laws and truly worthy specific applications.”); id. (Dyk, J., concurring) (“The
Mayo/Alice framework has thus proven to be both valuable and effective at invalidating overly
broad, non-inventive claims that would effectively ‘grant a monopoly over an abstract
idea.’ ” ); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 85 (2012) (“The
Court has repeatedly emphasized [claim breadth] concern, a concern that patent law not inhibit
further discovery by improperly tying up the future use of laws of nature.”).
194. See generally IPOA, supra note 20.
195. Id. at 10.
196. See HICKEY, supra note 22, at 24-25.
197. See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948);
Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank
Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
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While preemption analysis, as embodied in subject matter
eligibility, has found utility in distinguishing an ineligible judicial
exception from patent-eligible application in extreme cases, in its current
form it does not establish whether the claim covers unknown uses. What
it does in these extreme cases is to short-circuit the subject matter
analysis and conclude whether the claim is a principle or application is
irrelevant if the claim is so broad that failing for preemption is a foregone
conclusion. While the Court has tried to extend this analysis to cover
cases that deviate from these extreme examples, it has failed to create a
reliable framework.
Subject matter analysis is rooted in 35 U.S.C. § 101, which states
“[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title.”198 This language has remained
virtually unchanged since the Patent Act of 1793.199 At the heart of the
language is Thomas Jefferson’s view that inventiveness should be
liberally rewarded.200 The Court has explicitly recognized that the
Congressional intent of § 101 is for subject matter eligibility to be given
a wide scope.201 The judicial exceptions provide an important
counterbalance to this role by recognizing that some subject matter is so
fundamental that providing such an award does not promote the progress
of science.202
There is an important debate to be had as to how broad the judicial
exceptions should be.203 For example, should the judicial exceptions
cover not only abstract ideas, natural phenomenon, and laws of nature
but also equivalents thereof?204 However, this debate is independent of
determining whether society should award a patent for claims that cover
198. U.S.C. § 101 (1952).
199. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 966 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d but criticized sub nom. Bilski
v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (“The criteria for patentability established by the 1793 Act
remained essentially unchanged until 1952, when Congress amended § 101 by replacing the
word ‘art’ with ‘process’ and providing in § 100(b) a definition of the term ‘process.’ The
Supreme Court has made clear that this change did not alter the substantive understanding of
the statute; it did not broaden the scope of patentable subject matter.”).
200. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1011.
201. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 601 (“In choosing such expansive terms . . . modified by the
comprehensive ‘any,’ Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide
scope. Congress took this permissive approach to patent eligibility to ensure that ‘ingenuity
should receive a liberal encouragement.’ ” ).
202. See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948);
Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank
Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
203. See Lemley et al., supra note 174, at 1330 n.79.
204. See supra Section III.C.

2021]

PREEMPTION AND § 101 SUBJECT MATTER ANALYSIS

931

both known and unknown applications. While preemption may serve a
useful justification for classifying a claim as covering a principle,
intermixing the two in the subject matter analysis confuses the
independent role that each one plays.
In many ways, the preemption approach is remarkably similar to
the written description framework of 35 U.S.C. § 112:
[t]he purpose of the written description requirement is to prevent an
applicant from later asserting that he invented that which he did not;
the applicant for a patent is therefore required to ‘recount his
invention in such detail that his future claims can be determined to
be encompassed within his original creation.’205

The Federal Circuit has at least once suggested the role of the
written description requirement is to prevent the applicant from
preempting future development.206 Yet, with what seems to be a fluke
of history, the Court has not relied on § 112 for preemption analysis but
rather intermixed it with subject matter eligibility.207 Worse yet, because
§ 101 is a threshold question,208 determining claim breadth as part of
subject matter eligibility has resulted in § 112 to not develop the
necessary framework to analyze these claims.209 Therefore, it is crucial
that any framework used to analyze a claim recognizes each doctrine’s
distinct role and clearly establishes that preemption analysis is
independent of subject matter analysis.
One concern about removing preemption from the subject matter
analysis is that it risks turning § 101 into a dead letter law, which can
simply be overcome by crafty claim drafting.210 Given the low
invalidation rates for subject matter eligibility during the 1990s, that
concern would seem plausible.211 However, what this ignores is the role
205. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(quoting Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
206. Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“Claiming all DNA’s that
achieve a result without defining what means will do so is not in compliance with the
description requirement; it is an attempt to preempt the future before it has arrived.”).
207. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 63 (1972). Benson was the first supreme court
case covering computer technology and the Court chose to invalidate on subject matter
grounds instead of written description grounds. Id.
208. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981) (“[T]hat process is at the very least not
barred at the threshold by § 101.”); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 602 (2010) (“The § 101
patent-eligibility inquiry is only a threshold test.”).
209. Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 927 F.3d 1333, 1338
(Fed. Cir. 2019) (Dyk, J., concurring) (“Those sections [§ 102, § 103] and § 112 do not
adequately address ‘the risk that a patent on the [natural] law would significantly impede
future innovation.’ ” ).
210. Lemley et al., supra note 174, at 1318 (“[A]fter 1998, patentable subject matter was
effectively a dead letter.”); see also HICKEY, supra note 22, at 15.
211. See HICKEY, supra note 22, at 15.
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that subject matter eligibility plays. That is, to act as a rough filter to
weed out those claims that cover subject matter that is not suitable for
receiving patent protection—such as principles—and, in many ways, to
guide the innovator towards claims suitable for protecting—application
of those principles. This is a role that is well suited for the USPTO to
fulfill, and one in which they were fulfilling long before Mayo and
Alice.212 In addition, this concern ignores the court’s role in
counterbalancing the breadth of subject matter eligibility with the
judicial exceptions. Removing preemption from the subject matter
analysis does not remove judicial exceptions. Rather, it clarifies that the
two are distinct doctrines with their own objectives.
B. A New Framework
After removing preemption analysis from subject matter eligibility,
the challenge becomes how to determine when a claim is so broad as to
not deserve a patent. Benson provides the obvious extreme. That is,
where a claim covers both all known and unknown uses it is too broad
to receive patent protection.213 But beyond this extreme, the answer is
less clear. To arrive at an answer, there needs to be clarity around what
is meant by not patenting unknown uses.
One interpretation is that an innovator should not receive protection
for what they did not invent prior to the claimed invention’s effective
filing date. There is some merit to this interpretation as it seems
particularly unfair to grant an exclusive right to an innovator for
something that they did not create. However, this approach is flawed in
two significant ways. First, it is challenging to reasonably establish all
uses known to the innovator at the time of filing an application. This
would likely require an enormous disclosure, making examination
potentially unworkable. Second, and most importantly, the approach
focuses on what the inventor knows and not what would impede the
progress of science, which is the preemption’s actual objective.214
Whether or not an inventor knows of all uses is irrelevant to whether the
exclusion would prevent future innovations. As a result, this
interpretation would very likely be underinclusive, potentially leading to
absurd results in the courtroom with the court invalidating claims
because an innovator did not establish they knew of an obvious
modification covered by the claim, as well as potentially never-ending

212. See Chien, supra note 72.
213. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 68-72 (1972).
214. See O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 113 (1853).
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specifications that claim every possible combination or uses to prevent
such absurd results.
The proper interpretation seems to be that under the doctrine of
preemption a claim is overly-broad and should not be afforded protection
if it covers more than what the inventor can reasonably establish they
created, and any modifications that would be obvious to a person having
ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA). This approach’s main advantage is
it removes the subjective nature of measuring what is known to the
inventor, which is often amorphous and hard to define and relies on an
objective measure for determining claim breadth.215 Another advantage
is that the approach brings greater certainty to the applicant that the court
will not invalidate their claims due to failing to establish they knew all
potential applications of what the claim covers without impeding
science’s progress. It is important to note that while this approach does
leverage the PHOSITA standard of § 103, this standard merely provides
an objective measure to determine claim breadth and is not meant to
intermix the obviousness analysis with the preemption analysis.
C. Applications of the New Framework
As discussed above, there are striking similarities between § 112
and the preemption doctrine. There is an important debate beyond the
scope of this Article as to whether the claim breadth analysis should form
part of the § 112 framework, and whether that analysis is compatible
with that framework.216 However, what this Article has established is
the analysis should not form part of subject matter analysis. Further, the
analysis should be measured using an objective standard. For example,
in Flook the Court was concerned with a claim that automatically
updated an alarm limit in the field of catalytic conversion of
hydrocarbons using a mathematical formula.217 Under this new
framework, the Court would first consider whether the claim as a whole,
irrespective of any issues of novelty, non-obviousness, or claim breadth,
is a patent-ineligible abstract idea, or a patent-eligible application. As
the claim was directed to applying a mathematical formula to adjust an
alarm limit in a chemical process, the Court would likely find the claim
is directed to a patent-eligible application.

215. IPOA, supra note 20, at 3 (“In part as a reaction to this subjective ‘invention’
standard, Congress passed the Patent Act of 1952 with the intent that the scope of patenteligible subject matter be broad and that patentability would be determined on objective basis.
This approach was codified in section 103, which bases patentability on non-obviousness,
using the objective standard of a person of ordinary skill in the art.”).
216. See Lemley et al., supra note 174, at 1330 n.79.
217. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585-86 (1978).
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Once patent eligibility is established, the Court then considers
novelty, non-obviousness, written description, and claim-breadth.
Under the claim-breadth analysis, the Court compares the claim against
the specification and determines whether the claim only covers what the
inventor has established they knew at the time of filling and any obvious
modifications. Under this analysis, it is easy to see why the field
limitation in Flook does not save it from invalidation. The field
limitation not only would cover the intended scope of catalytic
converters for removing pollutants,218 but would also cover any catalytic
conversion of hydrocarbons including the production of fuels, synthesis
of commodity chemicals, and any other process that involves converting
hydrocarbons using any particular catalyst. Modifications of Flook’s
claimed invention to cover these fields would be far beyond obvious to
one having ordinary skill in the art and, therefore, the claim would be
correctly invalidated as overly broad.
Diehr provides a nice counterexample to Flook. Diehr’s claim was
directed to “[a] method of operating a rubber-molding press for precision
molded compounds aided by a digital computer” employing the
Arrhenius equation for determining curing time.219 As the claim is for
applying the Arrhenius formula to molding rubber, the Court would (and
did) find the claim is patent-eligible.220 The question then is whether the
claim is overly broad. What makes Diehr distinct from Flook is the
claim in Diehr is directed to a specific application of operating a rubbermolding press for precision molded compounds, versus Flook that is
directed to updating alarm limits in the field of catalytic conversion of
hydrocarbons.
Where the claim in Flook conceivably covers
applications in many areas beyond the intended application of catalytic
converters, Diehr is specific in its application, and any modifications the
claim covers would conceivably be obvious to those of ordinary skill.
As a result, the Court would likely find the claim does not extend beyond
the bounds of what the inventor knew or obvious modifications.
Finally, in Athena, the claim was directed to a method for
diagnosing certain neurological disorders by detecting antibodies to the
muscle-specific tyrosine kinase (MuSK) protein.221 What is particularly
interesting about Athena is it is very likely that the claim covers all
218. Parker v. Flook, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/cases/1977/77-642 (last visited Apr.
10, 2021) (“Dale R. Flook applied for a patent on a method of adjusting alarm limits in
response to changes that occur during the catalytic conversion process [of a catalytic
converter]”).
219. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177, 179 n.5 (1981).
220. Id. at 192-93.
221. Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 915 F.3d. 743, 746-47
(Fed. Cir. 2019).
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conceivable applications. However, it is hard to imagine any nonobvious application of an antibody’s correlation to a disease, other than
to diagnose the disease. The inability to find an inventive concept for
applying the natural law is why medical diagnostic patents have
struggled to find patent eligibility.222 Yet many agree that the progress
of science is hindered by not affording such invention protection.223
What Athena reflects is the balance between hindering the progress of
science by providing protection for overly broad claims and hindering
the progress of science by not providing any protection. It is irrelevant
whether the claim or patent covers all conceivable applications of a
principle, so long as it only covers what is known to the inventor and
obvious modifications. While science may not progress any further in
that particularly narrow field by granting the patent, there is likely no
more progress to be had in the field and science more generally will be
hindered by failing to grant the patent.
By framing the analysis in terms of what is known to the inventor,
the new framework properly addresses Athena’s issues. Under the new
framework, a reviewer would likely find the claim as patent-eligible as
it covers an application of a natural law—applying the correlation of the
antibody to the disease to diagnose the disease—and not the natural law
itself. A reviewer would also likely find the claim is not overly broad,
as it is directed to the specific application of diagnosing neurological
disorders related to MuSK. Even though the claim likely covers all
potential applications of the natural law, it is not necessarily overly broad
as all potential modifications of the application established by the
inventor would be obvious to one skilled in the art.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, with what seems to be a fluke of history, the Court
has developed a subject matter analysis framework that relies on the
preemption doctrine to justify invalidation. However, this Article has
established that preemption has a distinct objective that is more closely
aligned with the written description framework of § 112 than it is with
the subject matter eligibility framework of § 101. This Article suggests
that the intermixing of preemption analysis with subject matter
eligibility likely originated from the Court’s initial suspicion of subject
222. See Sanjeev Mahanta, Patent Eligibility of Medical Diagnostic Inventions: Where
Are We Now, and Where Are We Headed?, IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 14, 2019),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/04/14/patent-eligibility-of-medical-diagnosticsinventions-where-are-we-now-and-where-is-there-to-go/id=108263/.
223. Id.; see also Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 927 F.3d
1333, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (Chen, J., concurring).
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matter eligibility of computer programs in Gottschalk v. Benson, which
was further exacerbated in Parker v. Flook through the introduction of
an inventiveness test. While the Court would start to correct the record
in Diamond v. Diehr, it would later reverse course and further embrace
the inventive concept approach in Mayo Collaborative Services v.
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., and Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank. As a
result, the Court has created an arbitrary and difficult to apply test,
creating a chasm between the USPTO and courts reminiscent of the
period leading up to the 1952 Act.
To address the issues the patent system currently faces, this Article
proposes a new framework that separates the preemption analysis from
the subject matter eligibility analysis. Under this new framework,
subject matter eligibility would revert to its pre-Benson approach where
judicial exceptions only cover natural phenomenon, natural laws, and
abstract ideas but not their equivalents. Further, the preemption analysis
would be based on an objective standard where a claim is determined to
be overly broad if it covers more than what the inventor has established
they invented or modifications that are obvious to a person having
ordinary skill in the art. After establishing the new framework, this
Article shows that this new framework provides a reasonable
explanation for why the field limitation in Flook is not sufficient for
satisfying claim breadth which was unclear in the Court’s decision.
Finally, this Article contends that under this new framework the claim
in Athena would likely be found to be patent eligible, and not overly
broad, a result that many agree is reasonable given the nature of the
technology.

